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Abstract
Using data from the Brazilian Labor Monthly Survey (PME/ IBGE) for the years of 2006 
and 2007, the paper investigates if the wage differential by firm size in Brazil can be 
explained by the predictions of the Efficiency Wage Theory. It is adopted a Switching 
Regression Model to estimate if large size companies pay a higher wage premium for 
dispended labor effort, as compared to smaller enterprises. The results prove the EW 
predictions since they evidence positive relationships between wages and labor effort, 
schooling and longer job duration. However, such findings are not sufficient to explain 
the existence of wage differentials by firm size in the Brazilian labor market. 
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Resumo
Usando dados da Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME/ IBGE) para os anos de 2006 e 
2007, este artigo investiga se a diferença de salários por tamanho de firma no Brasil 
pode ser explicada pela Teoria do Salário Eficiência. Estimações de Switching Regression 
são utilizadas para verificar se as empresas de grande porte pagam um prêmio salarial 
maior aos seus funcionários por esforço despendido, comparativamente às pequenas 
empresas. Os resultados corroboram as predições do Salário Eficiência, uma vez que 
revelam uma relação positiva entre salário e esforço laboral e também entre escolari-
dade e duração no posto de trabalho. No entanto, esses resultados não são suficientes 
para explicar o diferencial de salários existente entre grandes e pequenas empresas no 
mercado de trabalho brasileiro. 
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1. Introduction
Empirical evidences demonstrate that different size enterprises pay 
different wages (Ahn, 2006; Fox, 2004; Arbache, 2001; Winter-
Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1999; Romanguera, 1991; Brown and 
Medoff, 1989; US Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census, 
1988, 1988; Barth et al., 1987). Most of them provide two sources 
of explanations. From one side, wage differentials by firm size arise 
because of firm and worker’s heterogeneity, and from the other side, 
companies with high monitoring costs pay higher salaries than the 
market clearing level (the Efficiency Wage Theory). In this paper we 
are particularly interested in verifying if the prediction of the EW 
theory, on its shirking version, can explain the wage differentials 
among different size firms in Brazil.
According to competitive theories, the occurrence of wage disper-
sion for similar workers would be basically a consequence of mea-
surement problems in empirical estimations. Features that are not 
directly captured in the datasets, such as individual s´ ability or non-
pecuniary worker preferences, cannot be incorporated in wage de-
termination models. 
For quite different mechanisms, the Efficiency Wage (EW) theory 
demonstrates how a wage distribution (for similar workers) can arise 
in equilibrium. The EW models incorporates the idea that enter-
prises would get better economic results if they remunerate their 
employees with a higher wage than the market clearing level and 
there are various reasons why the firms would behave in such a 
way. In the shirking version proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), 
firms that face high monitoring costs, such as the large companies, 
find shirking so costly that the payment of high wages is a proper 
incentive to extract labor effort. 
The existence of efficiency wage is supported by large empirical 
evidences (Rebitzer, 1995; Groshen and Krueger, 1990; Krueger and 
Summers, 1987 and 1988; Dickens and Katz 1987a and 1987b, and 
Groshen, 1986). In Brazil, it is worth mentioning three references. 
The work of Arbache (2001) found that unmeasured abilities and 
efficiency wage models played a role in the inter-industrial wage 
differentials for the decades of 1980s and 1990s. He estimated 
a significant and positive correlation between firm size and wage 
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differentials. Esteves (2008 and 2006) corroborated the efficiency 
wage theory by estimating a negative relationship between salary 
and intensity of supervision for several Brazilian industries in 2003 
and 2004. 
Most of the works in the literature frequently utilizes two proxy 
variables for labor effort: (i) firm size and (ii) the ratio of supervi-
sors/ employees. The problem with both proxies is that it is based 
on the restrictive hypothesis of exogeneity, when in the reality the 
amount of monitoring, supervisors and salaries are simultaneously 
determined by the firm. It is difficult to justify that in the profit 
maximization process, firms can choose the wages, but do not have 
any control on the quantity of supervisors per employee (Esteves, 
2006). 
The present article offers a new contribution in the analysis of ef-
ficiency wage by proposing the use of new proxy variables for the 
effort level, and distinct econometric method and dataset. The in-
formation about Sub-Occupation and Sub-Remuneration reported in 
the Brazilian Labor Monthly Survey (PME/ IBGE) is being adopted 
as the proxies for the level of labor effort. The advantage of using 
the PME survey is that it selects individuals from both the formal 
and informal labor market and this is an important assessment, given 
the expressive presence of the informal sector in Brazil. 
The relationship between firm size and salaries is estimated by using 
longitudinal data for Brazilian workers in 2006 and 2007 and a swit-
ching regression model, which is a technique that permits to control 
for the problem of individual self-selection into specific job occupa-
tions. The results have corroborated the presence of efficiency wages 
in the Brazilian labor market, since it was found a direct relationship 
between work effort and salaries. However, the wage premium paid 
for greater dedication to the jobs was not statistically different be-
tween large and small size companies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section in-
troduces a literature review about the EW models emphasizing on 
the developments of the shirking version. The following one presents 
the estimation strategies based on the switching model described in 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and discusses some endogeneity pro-
blems of econometric estimations. The fourth section brings the data 
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used for the estimations and briefly describes some characteristics 
of the Brazilian Labor Monthly Survey (PME/ IBGE). The results 
obtained are presented in the fifth and the last section concludes 
the paper. 
2. Literature Review on Efficiency Wage Models
Unlike the Walrasian approach, the EW theory is based on the 
premise that there are social and nonmarket aspects related to the 
production process that might push the wages above the market 
clearing level. Bowles (1985) refers to the models based on such 
premise as neo-Hobbesian because the concept of malfeasance, also 
known as shirking or free riding, is crucial to understanding the 
internal structure of the firm.1 
This author departs from the capital-labor relationship in the 
Marxian model and provides microeconomic foundations to explain 
the behavior of workers and firms. He demonstrates that the exis-
tence of a non-Walrasian wage would be a result of two specific as-
pects of the interaction between capital and labor. First, the employ-
ers-workers relationship would be marked by a conflict of interest in 
which the firm’s profits could be enhanced by being able to compel 
the worker to act in a manner that he or she otherwise would not 
choose. The second characteristic of the capital-labor interaction 
is that the strategies that capital may adopt in order to enhance or 
exercise its power over labor are costly. The employer can increa-
se the probability of detecting employee malfeasance through dis-
pending resources on surveillance personnel and equipment. It will 
be clear as follows how these concepts of shirking and intensity of 
supervision can give rise to the efficiency wage and the predicted 
trade-off between salaries and monitoring technology. 
There are various versions of the EW models that explain why it is 
profitable for an employer to fix the wage above the market clearing 
level and each of them exploit different mechanisms on the relation 
among worker, employer and the market forces. Romanguera (1991) 
1 According to Bowles (1985), the agent’s opportunistic behavior would give rise to the 
Hobbesian problem of reconciling self-interested behavior on the part of individuals with 
collective or group interests.
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lists seven distinct approaches for the EW models, which will be 
briefly described below: 
•	 Nutritional Model: the earliest of these models. It was deve-
loped by Leibenstein (1957) and established that the positive 
correlation between effort and wage would be motivated by 
the worker’s health and nutrition that could be achieved by 
highest consumption supported by higher salaries. 
•	 Adverse Selection Model: predicts that better workers have 
better alternative offers and that the high wage firms in-
crease the probability of attracting a better pool of applicants 
(Weiss, 1980, apud Romanguera, 1991). 
•	 Recruiting Model: emphasizes that firms find costly to have a 
job offer turned down because of recruitment costs and for-
gone production, therefore the entrepreneur has an incentive 
to catch the applicant by offering an elevated salary (Lang, 
1988 and Montgomery, 1988, apud Romanguera, 1991). 
•	 Sociological or Normative Model: relies on the idea that 
agents are not completely individualistic in their choices, but 
also value social conventions that are not totally individualis-
tic. As a consequence, the worker perceives his or her higher 
remuneration as a “gift” to be rewarded with more dedication 
to the job (Solow, 1979 and 1980; Akerlof, 1982 and 1984; 
and Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, apud Romanguera, 1991). 
•	 Union Threat Model: argues that collective action enables 
workers with bargaining power that allows them to appro-
priate part of the firm’s rents, which in turn leads to higher 
wages (Dickens, 1986 apud Romanguera, 1991).
•	 Turnover Model: it is very similar to the shirking version that 
will be presented next. This model assumes that labor turn-
over is costly for the firm because they lose the investments 
made on the job training and because workers have lower 
productivity in the adjustment process. As a result, firms in 
order to minimize such costs have incentive to prevent turn-
over by paying higher salaries (Salop, 1979 and Stiglitz, 1974, 
1985 apud Romanguera, 1991).
•	 The shirking version: it was proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984) and bases its structure on the following intuition: 
if unemployment represents a penalty for those who were 
caught shirking, then workers will choose not do so. The 
employers, on their side, in order to avoid shirking have in-
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centive to pay more than the “going wage”, thus if all firms 
act similarly the labor demand will reduce and, therefore, 
unemployment arises. Note that the employers cannot moni-
tor the activities of their employees costlessly and perfectly 
and that is why high wage represents savings for the firm 
both in monitoring costs and in the increased output due to 
higher effort. Therefore, there is an informational problem 
between employers and workers in the structure of this mo-
del that explains how involuntary unemployment can persist 
as an equilibrium phenomenon. 
The Basic Model of the Shirking Version (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984)
The model starts assuming that there are a fixed number of N 
identical workers who dislikes exerting labor effort and enjoy con-
sumption, with utility represented by U(w,e), where w is the wage 
earned and e is the level of effort put on the job activities. When 
an individual is unemployed, he or she receives a benefit of wb and 
e=0. There is a probability b, taken as exogenous, that a worker can 
be dismissed from the job due to relocation, for example, but not 
because he or she was caught shirking. However, if the employee 
shirks, there is some probability q that he or she will be caught and 
fired. The worker utility is maximized at a discount rate of r > 02. 
The only choice the worker makes is the selection of the effort level, 
by comparing the utility of shirking ( SEV ) and not shirking (
N
EV ). 
The utility equations of a shirker and nonshirker are given by:
 )( SEuSE VVqbw −++=               (1)
 )( NEu
N
E VVbew −+−=               (2)
where Vu is the utility of being unemployed that will be presented 
latter. Working with both equations yields the following solutions:
 
qbr
VqbwV uSE ++
++
=
)(
               (3)
 
2  When r is higher, the relatively more weight is attached to the short-run gains from shirking, 
until one is caught, compared to the losses incurred when one is eventually caught.
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The worker will not shirk if and only if SE
N
E VV ≥ , which produces 
the no-shirking condition (NSC):
            
(5)
Note that the critical wage  is positively related with the effort 
level (e), the utility of being unemployed ( uV ), the interest rate (r) 
and with the quit rate (b), but it is inversely related with the proba-
bility of being caught (q). 
From the employer’s side, the firm has a production function 
Qi = f(Li, Si), where L is the labor input and S is the supervisory in-
put. An enterprise pays s for its supervisors and w for its employees 
and must pay some level wb of unemployment benefits, which will 
be set at the minimum level as possible. The idea behind the EW 
theory is that companies might differ on their monitoring techno-
logy and, as a result, some will have incentive to pay more than the 
going wage. 
In order to find the no-shirking condition after incorporating the 
firm’s behavior, lets first present the utility of a worker being 
unemployed:
 )( uE
b
u VVaw −+=               (6)
where a is the job acquisition rate and EV  is utility of an employed 
worker, which equals to NEV , in equilibrium. Solving for (4) and (6), 
we have:
             
(7)
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Replacing (8) into the NSC (5) yields the aggregate NSC:
 qrbaeeww b /)( ++++≥             (9)
Observe that the critical wage is greater, the highest wb and the 
flows out of unemployment a. Since a is the probability of obtaining 
a job per unit of time, 1/a is the expected duration of unemploy-
ment, so the longer this duration, the smaller the wage necessary to 
induce nonshirking. In steady-state the flow into unemployment, bL, 
equals the flow out, a(N-L), which gives:
            (10)
Substituting for a into (9), the aggregate NSC becomes:
                                            (11)
where u = (N-L)/N, is the unemployment rate. Market equilibrium 
occurs when the aggregate NSC intersects the aggregate demand 
for labor. 
Equation (11) shows the mechanisms that induce companies to pay 
high salaries. From the worker’s point of view, he or she wishes 
to keep a high remuneration because entering into unemployment 
represents a penalty given the lost of the high wages themselves 
and because with high salaries the labor demand will be low, which 
implies long spells of unemployment. As a result, to keep that level 
of labor income, workers will choose to devote the highest amount 
of effort necessary to reach the critical wage at NSC. 
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From the firm’s side, when they have control on their monitoring 
technologies, two outcomes are possible, firms that face high moni-
toring costs will have incentive to pay at least  as a worker disci-
pline, and also because they want to keep a high level of output due 
to increased effort. But if the monitoring costs aren’t high enough, 
the firms do not need to pay an elevated salary because they can 
easily observe workers effort and this is a sufficient mechanism for 
no-shirking. 
3. Empirical Strategy and Endogeneity Problems
3.1 Endogeneity Issues Related to the Empirical Testing of the          
Efficiency Wage
The basic idea of the EW theory in its shirking version is that the 
payment of higher salaries and the threat of unemployment would be 
proper incentives to extract labor effort and such job dedication will 
be greater, the greater the amount of supervision inside the firm. 
Given that the labor effort is not readily observable, the intensity of 
supervision is normally used as its proxy in empirical estimations. 
Therefore, it is expected a trade-off between monitoring and wages. 
In the setup proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), firms choose 
both the wage (which guarantees the non-shirking condition) and 
the monitoring level S (which defines the probability of being caught 
shirking, q). The simultaneity associated with this choice creates 
problems in using variables related to supervision as proxies for 
labor effort, because the number of supervisors would not be an 
exogenous variable. As argued by Esteves (2006), it is difficult to 
justify that in the profit maximization process, firms can choose the 
wages, but do not have any control on the quantity of supervisors 
per employee.
In addition, there is also the problem of omitted variables corre-
lated with monitoring variables. Rebitzer (1995) demonstrates that 
in estimating a wage equation, the monitoring intensity is likely to 
be correlated with other human resource practices usually omitted 
in the models. Examples of such practices would be resources spent 
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on employee’s recruitment, screening or training, variables that do 
not use to be registered on datasets. 
Worker’s unmeasurable attributes also poses challenges for the em-
pirical testing of EW models. As an example, different individual’s 
ability cannot be controlled in cross section estimations. Besides, 
there is still the fact that the individuals might self-select them-
selves into specific companies since they might have non-pecuniary 
preferences for small firms. Some workers judge that large enter-
prises have a poor work environment because it has more rules, 
requests more intensive work or is more impersonal, thus, on the 
margin the employees have lower preferences for the big firms and 
the large employers need to pay a compensating wage to attract labor 
(Fox, 2004; Oi, 1983).
Another commonly used proxy for detecting labor effort is the firm 
size. In this case, the idea is that it would be harder to monitor a 
great amount of employees and the payment of higher wages would 
stimulate workers to devote more effort that could substitute the 
supervisory input. However, the use of firm size as a proxy for work 
dedication is also a problematic variable, because it might be the 
case that other factors, like the mentioned non-wage preferences 
for small firms, would be contributing for a positive relationship 
between wages and firm size. 
Considering these endogeneity problems, direct OLS estimations of 
supervision (or firm size) on salaries would produce biased estimates 
for the referred effort proxies. Many authors tried to overcome 
such issues by proposing original solutions. Groshen and Krueger 
(1990) found an exogenous variable for supervision intensity in the 
American health sector: the amount of supervisory nurse that is 
regulated by law and, therefore, is not on the firm’s control. Rebitzer 
(1995) tested the EW hypothesis for contract workers in the petro-
chemical industry and found a cleaner relationship between wages 
and supervision because there are specific institutional features 
surrounding the employment of such workers that guarantees the 
exogeneity of the monitoring variables. Esteves (2006) adopted the 
average job duration of supervisor workers for the Brazilian labor 
market, as an instrumental variable in a two-stage OLS estimation. 
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3.2  Empirical Model
In this section we present the empirical strategy used to investigate 
the inter-dependence of wage and firm size given worker and firm’s 
attributes. The hypothesis to be tested is that larger firms remune-
rate better the worker effort because it might be a proper strategy 
to minimize monitoring costs which are greater in bigger companies.
In order to investigate such question, this paper departs from the 
assumption that the decision of being employed can be seen as a 
two-part decision problem, where firstly the worker decides if she 
(or he) wants to work in a small or in a large firm and secondly her 
(or his) wage is determined. This assumption is based in Roy (1951), 
who considered that the existence of individual heterogeneous skills 
and self-selection into job occupations could create occupational dif-
ferentials of earnings. 
The application of the Roy Model is very suitable for the problem 
studied in the present paper, since it might be the case that the 
wage differentials by firm size could arise as a consequence of he-
terogeneous skills and levels of effort. According to Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005), the prototypical Roy model adapted to our problem 
is defined as follows. There is a latent variable *1y  indicating if the 
observed result is *2y  or 
*
3y , such as:
 0
0
0
1
*
1
*
1
1 ≤
>
=
i
i
i y
y
iff
iff
y               (12)
where 0*1 >iy  if the individual i works for small firm in 2006 and 
0*1 ≤iy  if he or she works for medium or large companies. Based in 
(12) it can be defined a linear system with additive errors for the 
latent variable:
                                                         (13)
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The first equation indicates if the person works or not in a small 
firm. The second and third equations have as dependent variable the 
growth of the natural logarithm of wage, between 2006 and 2007, 
for the individuals who work in small and large firms: , 
respectively. The vector  is composed of exogenous variables that 
represent the preferences and characteristics of individuals and mar-
ket, while  is a vector of instruments. The idea behind the system 
present in (13) is that αββ += 2'23'3 ii xx , where  is the extra-wage 
paid by larger enterprises for workers alike. Assuming that the corre-
lated errors have a joint normal distribution, the simplest parametric 
model is given by: 
 
23
23~                                     (14)
As usual (14) is normalized for 121 =σ . The most common esti-
mation strategy is the Heckman’s two-step method applied to the 
truncated means:
                      (15)
where )()()( 1
'
11
'
11
'
1 ββφβλ iii zzz Φ=  is the inverse-Mills ratio. At the 
first stage, it is estimated a probit model, which binary dependent 
variable ( *1y ) is whether the individual works or not in a small enter-
prise. This first-stage estimation is, thus, the selection equation and 
yields estimates of 1β  and )( 1
'
1 βλ iz . At the second stage, two separated 
OLS regressions give the estimates for  and 133 . Maddala 
(1983) provides further details for this model and calls it Switching 
Regression Model. 
An important comment is that the OLS regression of  on  
alone leads to inconsistent estimates of 2 and 3. It happens because 
the errors are correlated as the workers self select themselves into 
firms according to specific features such as the size. This, in turn, 
affects the wage determination. Therefore, the use of the switching 
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regression method, combined with the choice of the labor effort 
proxy variables, to test the existence of efficiency wage is a new 
contribution to address to some of the endogeneity issues present in 
the wage determination. 
4. Data Description
The paper uses data from the Brazilian Labor Monthly Survey 
(PME/ IBGE) for the years of 2006 and 2007. PME is a longitudi-
nal survey based on a rotating panel, where a group of households 
is selected in every sample sector and each of these households are 
interviewed for four consecutive months, after that they exit the 
survey to come back again eight months later and be followed for 
four additional months. The survey covers six metropolitan regions 
of Brazil: Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro 
and Porto Alegre. 
The target variable to be studied here is the salary paid on small and 
medium to large size firms, in order to check for the hypotheses of 
wage gap persistence as a result of EW mechanisms. The salary will 
not be taken in level but instead as a variation between the years of 
2006 and 2007, in an attempt to mitigate for fixed effect problems 
related, for example, to worker’s ability or non-wage preferences for 
the firm. The figure 1 below show the wage concentration curves in 
micro and medium enterprise. The results suggest that about 80% of 
workers received up to R$500 and until this value the workers from 
micro firms receive on average less than those of larger companies.
  
Figure 1 - Wage Curve of concentration of micro (gmicro) and medium (gmedia) 
Brazilian companies, between 2006 and 2007
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There are two groups of explaining variables included in the model, 
one capturing the usual worker’s socioeconomic features, such as 
gender, age, head of family and education, and the other covering the 
characteristics of the job, such as sector of activity, type of contract 
(if temporary or not), legal contribution for social security, time 
working for the firm, and two proxy variables designed to capture 
the effort level of the worker: sub-occupation and sub-remuneration. 
The individuals considered sub-occupied were those who worked less 
than 40 hours a week, but wished to work more, while sub-remune-
ration addressed to those employees who received a wage that was 
inferior to the average salary the category of similar workers used to 
earn. If the EW hypothesis is verified, we should expect a positive 
sign for both variables, given that the payment of higher salaries acts 
as a labor discipline for the employee.
The choice of these proxies followed the spirit of the studies of 
Bradley et al. (2007), Engellandt and Riphahn (2003), Booth et al 
(2000) and Jimeno and Cortes (1996), whose works chose as ef-
fort level proxies, unpaid overtime work or absenteeism. Note that 
sub-remuneration corresponds to unpaid overtime work because 
when the employee is sub-remunerated he or she is receives less per 
hour worked, being equivalent to working unpaid hours. While sub-
occupation can be seen as a propensity not to be absent, since the 
individuals reveal a desire to work more hours than they are actually 
doing. The use of the absenteeism variable would not be trustable in 
the present paper because the PME is answered by the employee and 
he or she would rather not reveal job absenteeism, a problem that 
doesn’t exist when the employer, instead, is interviewed. 
The selection of our database used workers employed in small firms 
with less than ten employees, and those employed in medium to lar-
ge firms, with eleven or more workers. After the removal of missing 
observations, we ended up with 37,024 observations, being 6,196 
workers in the small firms and 30,828 in the larger ones.
The data used for the estimations is presented in Table 1, which 
brings individual attributes of the worker and the job characteristics 
according to the firm size.
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Table 1 - Sample characteristic according to the firm size
CHARACTERISTICS
FIRM SIZE
SMALL MEDIUM AND LARGE
Individuals
Man 59.64% 62.47%
16 to 25 years old 30.94% 23.29%
26 to 40 years old 40.90% 44.84%
41 to 70 years old 28.16% 31.87%
Head of family 43.35% 48.93%
Years of school 3.07 3.40
From the job
Average wage R$ 602.66 R$1,593.62
Temporary contract 3.94% 4.65%
Social security contribution 52.94% 84.64%
Working for 1 month 1.63% 0.80%
1 month to 1 year of work 22.11% 17.25%
1 to 2 years of work 15.74% 13.88%
Working for more than 2 years 60.52% 68.07%
Sub-occupied 3.31% 2.13%
Sub-remunerated 26.74% 8.62%
Industry 12.41% 25.20%
Construction 8.04% 4.47%
Sales 32.12% 16.60%
Financial 20.56% 20.21%
Public administration 7.26% 15.44%
N° of observations 6,196 30,828
Source: Labor Monthly Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, PME/IBGE, 2006 and 2007).
Table 1 tells us that there exists some worker heterogeneity from 
individual and, especially, from the job aspects. Medium to large size 
firms employ in average a higher percentage of man, head of family 
and hire employees slightly more educated. The greatest difference 
arise in terms of the wage paid: the average salary of large firms is 
almost three times as greater as the one paid in small and medium 
enterprises. 
Another striking discrepancy is the social security contribution and 
sub-remuneration. The highest percentage of workers under sub-
remuneration helps to explain why the average wage of small firms 
is so much lower than the one paid in larger ones. 
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The social security contribution, on its turn, is also expected to be 
inferior in small companies, since this segment of the Brazilian labor 
market concentrates the highest amount of the so-called “informal” 
business that do not pay taxes and usual legal labor costs. 
Other differences important to mention, but not as remarkable as 
the ones just cited, refer to the labor duration and the percentage of 
sub-occupied workers. In average 23.74% of the labor force employed 
in small firms has been working for less than 1 year, against 18.05% 
in bigger enterprises. The percentage of sub-occupied workers is 
higher in small firms, as well. The distribution among economic 
sector is also heterogeneous by firm size: medium to large size fir-
ms concentrate labor demand on the industry segment, while small 
companies employ more on the sales sector
5. The Results for the Wage Growth Estimation in Brazil using 
Switching Regression Model
In this section, the key hypothesis of this paper is tested. The 
switching regression model is used to investigate if the predictions 
of the efficiency wage theory holds for Brazil. The idea is to test if 
large firms because of higher monitoring costs do pay a higher wage 
in order to extract more labor effort. 
As already discussed, individuals might self select themselves into 
specific companies according to non-wage preferences for the firm 
and heterogeneous abilities. The assumption is that this choice is 
associated to some demographic and occupational characteristics, 
such as the variables presented in the selection equation in Table 2.
The results in Table 2 indicate that the probability of working in a 
small size enterprise decreases with age, years of school, growth of 
schooling and within workers who are head of family. These results 
are consistent with empirical evidences provided by Fox (2004), in 
which he argues that it is efficient to match high-ability workers 
together with large employers because the marginal product of a 
manager supervising a large firm is greater. 
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Additionally, older workers or heads of family represent individu-
als carrying more familiar responsibilities, so they tend to be more 
experienced, value more the employment and, as consequence, are 
rather desired by more structured and large firms.
On the other hand, the chances of working on a small size enterprise 
increase within workers under temporary contract and who contri-
butes for social security. For the first case, Booth et al (2000) find 
evidences that temporary employees present greater probability of 
wishing to separate (either to change occupation or geographical lo-
cation) or have a higher cost (or lower benefit) in acquiring specific 
human capital. Considering that large size firms tend to invest more 
on firm-specific training in order to produce large standardized vo-
lumes of output, labor turnover can represent substantial cost for the 
large employer, therefore, they do not wish a worker who presents 
high probability of quitting. 
As for the positive relation between the chances of working in a 
small company and social security contribution, we have an unex-
pected result, which is possibly associated with the recent “forma-
lization” process in the Brazilian labor market that might be increa-
sing the chances of a worker who benefits from social security to 
be employed in a small firm. In fact between 2006 and 2007, the 
proportion of employees who contributed to social security in small 
firms increased 10%, while the growth observed in large firms was 
only of 3% (PME/ IBGE, 2006 and 2007).
The geographic dummies indicate that the probability of working in 
a small firm decreases in the metropolitan regions of Belo Horizonte, 
São Paulo and Porto Alegre relatively to the reference dummy of 
Salvador. This is an expected result since these three cities are lo-
cated in the most developed regions of Brazil, which concentrate 
larger and more structured companies, while Salvador is located in 
a poorer region. 
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Table 2 - Selection equation for working or not in small/ medium firms in 2006 
- First stage probit estimation
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERRORS
Age -0.0022* 0.0012
Man 0.0325 0.0247
School variation -0.2316*** 0.0106
Years of school -0.2488*** 0.0150
Head of family -0.0923*** 0.0213
Temporary contract 0.0870* 0.0449
Sub-occupied -0.0193 0.0713
Sub-remunerated 0.0273 0.0360
Social security contribution 0.0762* 0.0291
Working for 1 month -0.0412 0.0983
1 month to 1 year of work -0.0004 0.0291
1 to 2 years of work 0.0030 0.0341
Industry -0.0352 0.0347
Construction 0.0467 0.0546
Sales 0.0091 0.0357
Financial -0.0334 0.0358
Public administration -0.0285 0.0403
Belo Horizonte -0.1113** 0.0439
Rio de Janeiro -0.0370 0.0417
São Paulo -0.2179*** 0.0424
Porto Alegre -0.1551*** 0.0453
Recife 0.0206 0.0517
Constant -0.0215 0.0886
Bold coefficients for p-value: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table 3 brings the estimations of the second and third equations in 
(13), which corresponds to the wage growth equation by firm size. 
The solution for the system of equations in (13), which includes the 
selection equation (Table 2), is simultaneously obtained by maxi-
mum likelihood estimation. Table 3 shows us how the behavior of 
the wage growth varies with the size of the firm. 
The wage growth between 2006 and 2007 was greater amongst 
women and younger workers when compared to men and older indi-
viduals. It was also positively related with the increase in the years 
of school and with all the metropolitan regions located in the south 
of Brazil compared with the reference dummy, the city of Salvador. 
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Only when compared to Recife, a city from the same region as 
Salvador, this last city exhibit greater wage growth in the case of 
large companies. 
The wage increase was also directly associated with the period of 
time working for the firm, but at decreasing rates, which was ex-
pected, provided that firm cannot augment the salary at increasing 
rates as the worker lasts in the company. This tendency was espe-
cially clear after the first year of contract, for both groups of firm 
sizes. For larger enterprises, the wage growth increased at a faster 
rate after the first month to slow down after one year of contract, 
indicating that the first month was faced as probation for the worker 
and after succeeding it, he or she would earn a wage increase. 
The wage growth by economic sector revealed that the salaries in 
the industry increased less than other segments, in both size firms. 
For bigger companies this was also true for the financial sector, but 
not for the sales one. Social security contribution was inversed re-
lated with the labor income growth in the two groups of enterprises. 
This might be explained by the fact that it represents an indirect 
salary for the worker and a protection in the case he or she gets 
fired. Besides, when the firm decides to incur in such labor cost, it 
becomes more expensive to provide salary increase.
Finally we get to analyze the key variables to test if the predictions 
of the EW theory explain the wage differentials in Brazil, the pro-
xies for labor effort: sub-occupied and sub-remunerated. The results 
from Table 3 show that the effort variables were statically significant 
and positively related with the wage growth, in the two groups of 
firms, an outcome compatible with the EW theory. However, the 
Wald test for the difference between the coefficients from different 
size firms was not statistically significant, for both types of variables. 
This result would imply that the Brazilian firms, independent of the 
amount of hired workers, indeed seek to remunerate labor effort, as 
a strategy to increase productivity. Nevertheless, the price paid for 
dispended effort isn’t a sufficient force to explain the existence of 
wage discrepancy by firm size.
It is important to mention that, besides the association between 
labor effort and wages, the investments in education, as well as the 
permanence on the job for longer periods, can also be faced as re-
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sults derived from the EW theory. From one side, employers have 
incentive to pay more than the market-clearing wage in order to 
attract more productive and skilled labor, expecting to minimize the 
monitoring costs, and from the other side, the greater is the emplo-
yee’s fidelity to the firms, the less expenses the enterprise will face 
with labor turnover. We already argued that the monitoring costs 
and labor turnover the firms use to face represent proper incentives 
to induce firms to attract more qualified labor and individuals who 
would rather not shrink because the penalty for losing their jobs 
would be long spells of unemployment and the lost of the elevated 
salary. 
Table 3 - Estimation for the wage growth between 2006 and 2007 by firm size
VARIABLES
SMALL MEDIUM AND LARGE
COEF. STAND. ERR COEF. STAND. ERR
School variation 0.2568*** 0.0133 0.2868*** 0.0062
Age -0.0174*** 0.0016 -0.0184*** 0.0008
Man -0.2582*** 0.0352 -0.2215*** 0.0167
Sub-occupied 0.3209*** 0.1054 0.3424*** 0.0497
Sub-remunerated 0.5566*** 0.0529 0.6122*** 0.0251
Social security contribution -0.2400*** 0.0416 -0.1284*** 0.0197
Working for 1 month 0.2829* 0.1455 0.1742** 0.0676
1 month to 1 year of work 0.2087*** 0.0423 0.2115*** 0.0203
1 to 2 years of work 0.1405*** 0.0499 0.1828*** 0.0240
Industry -0.1263** 0.0507 -0.1055*** 0.0243
Construction -0.0407 0.0805 -0.0525 0.0389
Sales 0.0439 0.0521 0.0733** 0.0253
Financial -0.0731 0.0521 -0.0557** 0.0250
Public administration 0.0538 0.0588 0.0443 0.0280
Recife -0.0431 0.0741 -0.1203** 0.0378
Belo Horizonte 0.3193*** 0.0636 0.2293*** 0.0316
Rio de Janeiro 0.3123*** 0.0596 0.1994*** 0.0304
São Paulo 0.6418*** 0.0629 0.4911*** 0.0302
Porto Alegre 0.5149*** 0.0662 0.3106*** 0.0324
Constant 1.5439*** 0.1299 0.4355*** 0.0469
Bold coefficients for p-value: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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6.    Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to study if the wage differential between 
small and medium to large size firms in Brazil could be explained by 
the predictions of the EW theory, emphasizing the role of dispen-
ded labor effort and the wage premium. Using data from the Labor 
Monthly Survey (PME/ IBGE) for the years of 2006 and 2007, the 
following hypothesis was tested: large size firms pay higher wages 
because they tend to remunerate better the effort in order to mini-
mize monitoring costs, which are greater when compared to smaller 
enterprises. 
On such investigation we adopted empirical strategies based on a 
Switching Regression Model. On the first stage, probit estimations 
characterized the chances of working or not in a small size firm. 
Given the possible role of endogeneity involved in such decision of 
working or not in small firms, simultaneous equations models were 
estimated in order to incorporate the mentioned choice. These mo-
dels were used to estimate the wage growth between 2006 and 2007 
for the two groups of firms studied: small and medium/ large. 
The obtained estimates corroborated the idea that the dedication 
to labor effort had a positive impact on the wage. Furthermore, the 
growth of schooling and the longer permanence of the worker on 
the firm were also directly related with the increase of wage. These 
results were largely favorable to the predictions of the EW theory on 
its shirking version; however, they were not sufficient to explain the 
existence of wage differentials in the Brazilian labor market. 
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